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Abstract 
A significant work is happening globally on the measurements of public sector debt to enhance its 
sustainability. Though adoption of standards is likely to take time, however, few applications are gradually 
getting accepted internationally. 
In the present chapter an attempt has been made to measure the sustainability of public debt of Oman and 
provide a framework based on the international practices to review and propose policy options for the 
Central Bank of Oman (CBO) and Ministry of Finance (MOF).  
The Financial Affairs Council (FAC) and the MOF are the two apex authorities responsible for all financial 
matters in Oman. The FAC is composed of MOF and representatives from the CBO and the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA). The MOF proposes to the FAC financial policies related to regulations for adoption and 
also monitors their implementation. Also, the MOF has authority to borrow on behalf of the Government 
and keeps records of the government’s financial transactions. The specification like the purpose of 
borrowing, limits of borrowing and objectives of debt management strategy are not spelled out clearly. 
And, the reporting of debt management activities is not mandated. In addition, there is no Public Debt Act 
in Oman. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the global scenario and solutions of public debt management, 
the current challenges and debt market development in order to identify relevant policy options for the 
authorities in the Sultanate of Oman.  
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Introduction 
Oman is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income developing country, with a GDP of U.S. 
$16,910 per capita on a nominal basis in 2015. The IMF projects that Oman's nominal GDP per capita on 
a PPP basis will be U.S. $44,470 in 2017. The production and export of crude oil and natural gas is the 
principal activity of the Omani economy, contributing 28.2 percent of nominal GDP in the first nine months 
of 2016 and 36 percent of nominal GDP in 2015. As such, the performance of the petroleum industry may 
directly affect industries that are tangential to, or reliant on, the petroleum industry as well as having more 
indirect effects on the economy as a whole, such as reductions in consumer purchasing power or mobility. 
In addition, petroleum activities are the principal source of government revenues (approximately 74.3 
percent of total government revenues in 2016) and, therefore, indirectly affect the performance of the non-
oil sectors of the economy through their effect on Government allocation of its expenditure in those sectors. 
As a result, fluctuations in the price of oil is the major contributing factor to Oman's economic performance. 
The economy's vulnerability to oil price movements as well as the finite nature of oil reserves have led the 
Government of Oman to exploit significant gas reserves, to promote investment in the non-oil and gas 
sectors of the economy. 
When the income of the government is insufficient to meet its expenses, the government of that country 
borrows money either within the country or abroad and such a borrowing creates public debt. The public 
debt is different from private debt as it consists of the obligations of individuals, business firms, and 
nongovernmental organizations. While, Obligations of government, particularly those evidenced by 
securities, to pay certain sums to the holders at some future time. 
The debt owed by national governments is usually referred to as the national debt and is thus eminent from 
the public debt of state and local government bodies. In the United States, bonds issued by the states and 
local governments are known as municipals. In the United Kingdom, debt or loans incurred by local 
authorities are referred to as corporation, or county, loans, thus distinguishing them from central 
government debt, which is frequently referred to simply as funds. In the past, paper money was frequently 
regarded in the United States as a portion of the public debt, but in more recent years money has been 
regarded as a distinct type of obligation, in part because paper money is usually no longer payable in gold, 
silver, or other specific items of intrinsic value.  
Public debt is an obligation of a government; and, although individuals are called upon in their capacity as 
taxpayers to provide funds for payment of interest and principal on the debt, their own property cannot be 
attached to meet the obligations if the government fails to do so. Similarly, government property normally 
cannot be seized to meet these obligations. With sovereign governments, the debt holders can take only 
such legal action to enforce payment as the governments themselves prescribe.  
1. Forms of public debt can be classified in a number of different ways:  
2. Maturity: as short term or long term 
3. Issuer: Direct obligations, contingent obligations, or revenue obligation  
4. Location of the debt: Internal or external 
5. Marketability: Negotiable securities (marketable) or nonnegotiable securities.  
Significance of Public Debt Management  
Public debt management is the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the 
government’s debt in order to raise the required amount of funding, pursue its cost and risk objectives, and 
to meet any other public debt management goals the government may have set, such as developing and 
maintaining an efficient and liquid market for government securities.  
Each government faces strategy concerning debt management objectives, its preferred risk tolerance, how 
to establish sound governance for public debt management. On many of these issues, there is increasing 
convergence in the global debt management community on what are considered prudent sovereign debt 
management practices that can also reduce vulnerability to contagion and financial shocks.  
These include: 
1. Clear objectives for debt management  
2. Evaluating risks against cost considerations  
3. Separation and coordination of debt and monetary management objectives and accountabilities 
4. Limit on debt expansion 
5. Developing a sound institutional structure and policies for reducing risk, clear delegation of 
responsibilities and associated accountabilities among government agencies involved in debt 
management 
The size and complexity of a government’s debt portfolio often can generate substantial risk to the 
government’s balance sheet and to the country’s financial stability. Sound debt structures help governments 
reduce their exposure to interest rate, currency and other risks. 
Developing the market for government securities can also help to stimulate the development of domestic 
markets for private securities. For example, in Japan the development of the secondary market for 
government securities is considered to be an important objective for debt management because this market, 
by virtue of being low credit risk, serves as the foundation for domestic financial markets, and is by far the 
most actively traded segment of the domestic bond and debenture market. 
In all of the countries studied, the legal authority to borrow in the name of the central government rests with 
the parliament or congressional legislative body. However, practices differ with respect to the delegation 
of borrowing power from the parliament to debt managers. In most of the countries, legislation has been 
enacted authorizing the Ministry of Finance to borrow on behalf of the government. In some others, that 
power has been delegated to the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet), and in case of India power lies directly 
to the central bank. Whether the delegation is to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry, or Minister of 
Finance seems to be more of a formality that recognizes country conventions regarding the decision making 
within the government than a practical matter. 
Another example of a legislative debt ceiling is the one used by Poland. Poland has inserted into its 
constitution a requirement that total government debt, augmented by the amount of anticipated 
disbursements on guarantees, is not allowed to exceed 60 percent of GDP, the debt limit stipulated by the 
Maastricht treaty. Denmark and   the U.S. are examples of other countries that also have legislative limits 
on the stock of debt outstanding.   
Four countries (Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, and the U.K.), all highly developed and with well-functioning 
domestic capital markets, have created separate debt agencies for the management of the central 
government debt. However, in other countries there are ongoing discussions about the merits of such an 
agency. One argument, which is often mentioned in favor of a separate agency, is that it provides for more 
focused debt management policy, in part because there is a top management whose main   responsibility is 
debt management, not fiscal or monetary policy, and thus has the time to focus on debt management issues. 
When debt management is part of the Ministry of Finance or central bank, there is a risk that debt 
management policy could be a secondary consideration. This focus fosters professionalism and gives debt 
management staff attention from top management. However, as noted by some countries at the Outreach 
conference, if one goes down this path, the introduction of a separate debt agency should be accompanied 
by strong internal governance, accountability, and transparency mechanisms to ensure that the agency 
performs as expected, and is held accountable for its decisions. 
In particular, the debt manager should carefully assess and manage the risks associated with foreign 
currency and short-term or floating-rate debt, and ensure there is sufficient access to cash to avoid the risk 
of not being able to honor financial obligations when they fall due.  
Besides, the US and other major nations now run record budget deficits, and likely to continue for decades 
to come amid rising public leverage ratios that approaches levels last ever seen in World War II, which 
according to Salsman, (2017) is a matter of grave concern and needs to be re-examine the public debt 
history, theory and practice. 
Literature Review 
In a study by Chiu & Lee (2017) the results show evidence of the different debt-growth nexus under the 
different degrees of country risk. Under a high-risk environment, a country's economic growth is harmed 
by raising its public debt. The negative effects public debt has on economic growth become weak under 
low political and financial-risk environments, while an increase in public debt could help to stimulate 
economic growth under low composite and economic risk environments. 
It has also been showed by the research by Debortoli, Nunes, & Yared (2017) how the optimal time-
consistent maturity structure is nearly flat because reducing average borrowing costs is quantitatively more 
important for welfare than reducing fiscal policy volatility. Thus, under lack of commitment, the 
government actively manages its debt positions and can approximate optimal policy by confining its debt 
instruments to consoles. 
There are studies as well conducted on how institution quality, through the international governance index, 
impacts pilling of public debt in seventeen states of Middle East and North African region. The results have 
shown that three governance indicators impact the public debt of the region and are political stability and 
absence of violence index, regulatory quality index and rule of law index (Tarek & Ahmed, 2017).  
The positive response of the primary surplus to changes in debt also shows that U. S. fiscal policy is 
satisfying an intertemporal budget constraint (Bohn, 1998). While, as the relationship between public debt 
and GDP growth varies significantly by period and country (Herndon et.al., 2014). 
 Also, there is some evidence of nonlinearity with higher levels of initial debt having a proportionately 
larger negative effect on subsequent growth. Analysis of the components of growth suggests that the 
adverse effect largely reflects a slowdown in labor productivity growth mainly due to reduced investment 
and slower growth of capital stock (Kumar & Woo, 2010). 
The panel of 16 OECD countries over several decades investigates the effects of government debts and 
deficits on long-term interest rates. In simple static specifications, a one-percentage-point increase in the 
primary deficit relative to GDP increases contemporaneous long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. 
The effect of debt on interest rates is non-linear: only for countries with above-average levels of debt does 
an increase in debt affect the interest rate. World fiscal policy is also important: an increase in total OECD-
government borrowing increases each country's interest rates. However, domestic fiscal policy continues 
to affect domestic interest rates even after controlling for worldwide debts and deficits (Ardagna, et.al, 
2007). 
There has also been study conducted on the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios across country groups for 
several decades, episodes of debt spikes and reversals, and a pattern of negative correlation between debt 
and growth (Abbas, 2010). 
Since the start of the financial crisis, industrial country public debt levels have increased dramatically. And 
they are set to continue rising for the foreseeable future. A number of countries face the prospect of large 
and rising future costs related to the ageing of their populations. There are projections of public debt ratios 
that suggest the path pursued by fiscal authorities in a number of industrial countries is unsustainable. 
Drastic measures are necessary to check the rapid growth of current and future liabilities of governments 
and reduce their adverse consequences for long-term growth and monetary stability (Cecchetti, 2010). 
A study by Jaimovich & Panizza (2010) finds that industrial countries show a clear trend, with debt 
increasing from 45 to 60% of GDP over the period under observation. A new data set that includes complete 
series of central government debt for 89 countries over the period 1991 to 2005 and for 7 other countries 
for the period 1993 to 2005. 
Besides there are finding like Panizza & Presbitero (2014) and Pandow (2001) that there is no evidence that 
public debt has a causal effect on economic growth is important in the light of the fact that the negative 
correlation between debt and growth is sometimes used to justify policies that assume that debt has a 
negative causal effect on economic growth. 
Methodology 
The debt sustainability in this study was measured on the basis of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), export 
incomes, and fiscal revenue. In this study, the total debt of the government of Oman is also studies and 
analyzed.  Further the paper employees the following ratio to assess the public debt situation of Oman. 
 Ratio of Public debt over GDP: The debt over GDP ratio is the ratio between Oman government’s 
debt and its gross domestic product. A low debt-to-GDP ratio indicates an economy that produces 
and sells goods and services sufficient to pay back debts without incurring further debt. The reason 
for using this ratio is that the GDP ratios allows the pointers to be tuned with the size of the economy 
 Ratio of Public debt over Exports: The public debt to export ratio is used to calculate Oman’s total 
amount of debt in comparison to its total amount of exports. This is an important way for countries 
like Sultanate of Oman to measure their independent sustainability. The percentage will assists the 
country to determine its growth rate. Also, the export income ratios indicate whether the country 
can be projected to generate adequate foreign exchange to meet its external debt requirements in 
the future; 
 Ratio of Public debt over Revenue: The public debt to revenue ratio calculated the Oman’s total 
amount of debt in comparison to its total revenue in that fiscal. Also, the revenue ratios measure 
the government’s ability to muster domestic means to return debt. 
Besides, the paper analyzes the Oman government’s domestic and external public debt position as well. 
The utmost applicable measure of repayment ability depends on the restrictions that are the most binding 
for a specific country. Ratios of debt stock relative to repayment capacity measures indicate the burden 
represented by the upcoming commitments of a country and thus reflect long-term risks to credit 
worthiness, while the time path of debt-service ratios indicates the probability and possible timing of 
fluidness problems. 
 
 
Situating Public Debt in Oman 
In February 2016, S&P downgraded Oman’s long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit rating 
to BBB- from BBB+, with a stable outlook. Also, in May 2016, Moody’s downgraded Oman’s long-term 
issuer rating to Baa1 from A3, with a stable outlook. 
Further, in March 2017 Oman's Baa1 rating with a stable outlook reflects its high wealth levels and a still 
comparatively strong government balance sheet, balanced against credit challenges, including its heavy 
reliance on the oil and gas sector, Moody's Investors Service reported recently. 
A Moody's Senior Credit Officer, Steffen Dyck in the report mentions, “Although we expect government 
debt to rise to 40% of GDP by 2018 from less than 5% at the start of the oil price shock, Oman's fiscal 
buffers will support the country through its process of fiscal and external adjustment.”  
For 2016-2020, Moody's forecasts real GDP growth in Oman of around 2.1% per year on average, 
significantly lower than the 3.8% average annual growth seen between 2011 and 2015. This forecast is 
based on Moody's expectation of only limited increases in oil and gas production and the dampening effect 
from ongoing fiscal consolidation on non-oil real GDP growth. 
Moody's expects Oman's 2017 fiscal deficit to narrow substantially to OMR3.1 billion ($8.1 billion, 11.4% 
of GDP) from an estimated OMR5.0 billion ($13.0 billion, 20.1% of GDP) in 2016, and fiscal deficits will 
continue to decline gradually over the following years. 
While Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are well-positioned on average to withstand external 
payment pressures, Bahrain and Oman are more exposed due to their low levels of foreign exchange 
reserves and large current account deficits, Moody's Investors Service said in a recent report.A current 
account surplus of close to 18% of GDP on average across GCC countries over 2005-2014 has shifted to a 
deficit of -3.4% in 2016, up from -0.6% in 2015. 
In 2016, Oman had the highest current account deficit among GCC countries, which Moody's estimates at 
20.1% of GDP, and the highest external breakeven oil price at $78.4 per barrel, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bahrain and Saudi Arabia registered moderate current account deficits 
of around 3.3-3.4% of GDP, while Qatar's was much smaller at -0.5%, according to Moody's estimates. 
The Central Bank of Oman in its Bi-Monthly Publication Special Issue mentions that preliminary 
calculations suggest that actual fiscal deficit for the fiscal year 2016 is expected to reach RO 5.3 billion, an 
increase of 60% of the deficit estimated in the Budget, which is considered the highest deficit level in the 
history of the General Budget. The increase in deficit is caused by several factors, including decline in the 
actual achieved oil price (from $45 estimated in the Budget to the actual $39), and decrease in the actual 
achievement of a number of articles of non-oil revenues clauses along with increased general spending on 
the Budget estimates. 
Despite the severity of the challenges faced by the Budget, the government has been able to provide the 
necessary funding for spending by relying heavily on external borrowing so that domestic liquidity can be 
made available for the financing needs of private sector in the country. International bonds worth $4 billion 
were issued together with collective commercial loans worth $5 billion, export proxy guarantee loans worth 
$2 billion and Islamic Sukuk worth half a billion US dollars. 
Borrowing from foreign and domestic financial institutions and issuing Sukuk and development bonds and 
treasury bills formed 72% of the required funding, while the remaining 28% was covered by the reserves. 
Rising deficits during the years 2015 and 2016 gave rise to the volume of the State’s general debt to the 
GDP by the end of 2016 to 29%, which means debt service rate will rise successively in the coming years. 
In accordance with a report ‘Developing Debt Market in Oman: A Road Map’ by Economic Research and 
Statistics Department, Central Bank of Oman mentions that the size of borrowing requirement of the 
Government is determined by the magnitude of budget deficit. Given the size of budget deficit, either the 
Treasury department or the central bank, on behalf of the Government, conducts primary auctions, manages 
public debt in terms of timing of issuance, magnitude, type of auction, mode of payment and settlement, 
maturity of debt based on well-established debt management practices. Often the central bank works as 
front and/or middle office while back office functions are retained by the Treasury. The secondary market 
transactions are generally put through stock exchanges although over-the-counter transactions are also 
allowed in many jurisdictions. Moreover, central banks generally act as depository to public debt issued in 
domestic currency and thereby facilitate the issuance of domestic public debt in demat form. Besides 
outright transactions, government securities are also used as collateral in case of inter-bank transactions as 
well as transactions with the central bank. As stakeholders are many, there is a need for Public Debt Act 
and guidelines should be well codified with clear responsibilities vested with respective authorities. 
The Financial Affairs Council (FAC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) are the two apex authorities 
responsible for all financial matters in Oman. The FAC is composed of MOF and representatives from the 
Central Bank of Oman (CBO) and the Capital Market Authority (CMA). The MOF proposes to the FAC 
financial policies related to regulations for adoption and also monitors their implementation. According to 
the Royal Decree 39/96, the MOF has authority to borrow on behalf of the Government and keeps records 
of the government’s financial transactions. The decree does not specify the purpose of borrowing, limits of 
borrowing and objectives of debt management strategy. Reporting of debt management activities is not 
mandated. There is no Public Debt Act in Oman. 
According to the Banking Law 2000, the CBO can borrow funds on behalf of the Sultanate provided the 
loans are guaranteed by the Government. To meet temporary cash flow needs of the Government, the CBO 
can provide short-term credit to the Government by way of overdraft up to a limit. The amount of such 
overdraft limit from the CBO together with outstanding Treasury Bills issued on behalf of the Government 
shall not exceed 10 percent of budgeted current revenues and needs to be repaid within 90 days. Public debt 
management is entrusted to the Treasury department of the MOF. There are two separate units for debt 
issues, one for external debt and the other for domestic debt. External debt office (Loan Department) 
performs both front and back office functions. The domestic debt office is known as Treasury Department 
which mainly performs back office functions. The front office functions for domestic debt are performed 
by the CBO as an agency of the Government as specified in a memorandum of understanding. A committee 
of MOF and CBO officials is supposed to meet regularly for the issuance of Treasury Bills and once in 
every quarter for the issuance of development bonds (DBs). The CBO conducts auctions of Treasury Bills 
and DBs and keeps a registry of Treasury Bills. Issuance of Treasury Bills has been discontinued since 2005 
due to improved fiscal position of the Government. Before every auction of development bonds, the CBO 
publishes the terms of each issue. As soon as the auctions are over, the CBO transfers the registry of 
development bonds to the Muscat Clearing and Depository Co. (MCDC) Vide Royal Decree No.82/98, 
February 25, 1998. Earlier, it was called Muscat Depository and Securities Registration Company 
(MDSRC). 
According to Article 26 of the Banking Law, 2000, the CBO can issue its own securities to conduct 
monetary operations. Currently, the CBO is issuing 28-day CBO CDs on a weekly basis to mop-up excess 
liquidity from the system. The CBO CDs are eligible as collateral for inter-bank repo as well as for repo 
transactions with the CBO. The CBO is the clearing house and central depository for the CDs. 
The share of medium and long-term loans in the total public debt increased steadily form 36.4 percent in 
2005 to nearly 75 percent in 2009. Public debt to GDP ratio declined from 8.6 percent in 2005 to 4.2 percent 
in 2008 before rising to 5.7 percent in 2009. Improvement in the overall fiscal balance, following steady 
increase in crude oil prices in the global markets contributed to the decline in debt-GDP ratio during the 
recent years. 
The Sultanant of Oman's National Government Debt reached 6.5 USD billion in Dec 2015, compared with 
4.0 USD billion in 2014 and was at a record low at 2.5 USD bn in Dec 2008. The Central Bank of Oman 
provides Government Debt in local currency.  
Figure:1 
 
According to the CBO Oman's Net government debt position to the GCC countries remains manageable 
however, IMF forecasts as can be seen in the figure 1 that the trend will deteriorate further in the coming 
years. It calls for a significant reduction in current spending, an increase in oil prices in the short to medium 
run, strengthening of the institutions and a restructuring of the economy in the long run. 
Also, protracted low oil prices continue to weigh on Oman’s economy. The OPEC agreement to cut oil 
production in 2017 and the government’s ongoing commitment to austerity are likely to further depress 
growth. Fiscal and current account deficits remain large, and Oman is increasingly resorting to external 
borrowing to finance its deficits. However, growth is expected to pick up in 2018 as Oman pins hopes for 
its economic diversification plan on the fisheries and tourism sectors, a report by the World Bank titled 
GCC: Economic Outlook- April 2017, mentions. 
Real GDP growth in Oman is estimated to have slowed down to 2.2% in 2016 from 5.7% in 2015, according 
to official Omani estimates. Non-hydrocarbon GDP growth is estimated to have dropped to 2% in 2016 
from 7% in 2015 as public spending declined with knock-on effects on investment and consumption. 
Hydrocarbon GDP growth nearly halved in 2016, falling from 4.2% in 2015 to 2.4% in 2016. 
Overall real GDP growth is projected to slow down further in 2017 to just under 1% owing to the agreement 
reached with OPEC producers to cut oil production until June 2017 and the dampening effects of 
government spending cuts on business sentiment and private consumption. The 2017 planned budget has 
cut spending by 8% leading to a budgeted deficit of 10.6% of GDP. However, with further delays in 
consolidation efforts, the budget deficit could reach 13.9% in 2017. Monetary policy will remain tight as 
interest rates continue to rise. Owing to the hike in electricity tariffs and higher global food prices, inflation 
is expected to inch up to 1.4%. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The Ministry of Finance is the only institution entitled to borrow on behalf of the Government of Oman. 
Municipalities are not permitted to borrow. The Government of Oman intends to establish a debt 
management office in the coming years in order to manage its rising debt levels. The following table 1 sets 
forth the debt of the Government of Oman as at 31 December for each of the seven years ended 31 
December 2016. 
Table: 1 
Debt of the Government of Oman 
 
As on 31 December (OMR millions, except percent)  
2010 
  
2011 
  
2012 
  
2013 
  
2014 
  
2015 
  
2016 
Government domestic debt (OMR million) 
330.0 480.0 630.0 830.0 930.0 2,540.1 2,436.0 
Per cent. of Annual GDP 1.5% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 3.0% 9.4% 10.5% 
Government external debt (OMR million) 
806.2 767.3 730.5 656.1 595.7 901.3 5,161.7 
Per cent. of Annual GDP 3.6% 2.9% 2.5% 2.2% 1.9% 3.3% 22.2% 
Total government debt 1,136.2 1,247.3 1,360.5 1,486.1 1,525.7 3,441.4 7,597.7 
Per cent. of Annual GDP 5.0% 4.8% 4.6% 4.9% 4.9% 12.7% 32.6% 
Annual GDP 22,547.6 26,122.0 29,353.3 30,061.3 31,450.8 27,013.1 23,301.9(1) 
(1)
On an annualized basis. 
Source: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of Finance 
 
The tendency of the government debt in the coming years is expected to shoot up and based on the past 
data, the future projection expects the total government debt to cross the 35,000 OMR millions in near 
future. It has been indicated that the legislators should follow a sustainable fiscal policy (Baharumshah, 
Soon & Lau, 2017). Also, the trend for the next couple of years based on the table 1 can be seen in the 
below mentioned line graph 1 and it is based on the past data and future projection are calculated through 
quadratic with an equation of the line as below: 
Y=346.03X21913.3X+3274.8 
R2= 0.9094 
Graph 1 
 
Source: Self calculation 
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 Table 2: Ratio of Public debt over GDP 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Public Debt 1,136.20 1,247.30 1,360.50 1,486.10 1,525.70 3,441.40 7,597.70 
GDP 22,547.60 26,122.00 29,353.30 30,061.30 31,450.80 27,013.10 23,301.90 
Percent Govt. 
Debt to Annual 
GDP 5.00% 4.80% 4.60% 4.90% 4.90% 12.70% 32.60% 
Sources: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of Finance 
Besides, it is clearly visible from the table 2 that the public debt to GDP ratio has gone up from 5 percent 
in 2010 to almost 33 percent in 2016 which is a matter of concern for the Oman governemt. The future 
projection can be see in the graph 2 based on trend line equations. Though there have been no evidence for 
a generally appropriate threshold effect in the association between public debt and economic growth. 
Notwithstanding the threshold, however, it has been found substantial a negative effect of increase in public 
debt on the growth (Chudik, Mohaddes, Pesaran, & Raissi, 2017). 
Graph 2 
 
Source: Self calculation 
Though there has been a drop in the exports however, the country still has managed to raise it to a comprable 
level of 2011 in 2016. Still the worrying factor is the ratio of public debt over exports which has grown 
significantly since the year 2011 from 6.89% to almost 47% in 2016. At the present level of the publiic debt 
which is at 7,597 OMR millions the exports to the tune of 16,367OMR millions is not healthy at all and 
needs to be brought down to a sustainable level. It can be achieved either by increasing the exports or 
decreasing the public debt. The trend lines based on the past data shown in the graph 3 are also not favorable. 
Table 3: Ratio of Public debt over Exports 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Public Debt 1,247 1,361 1,486 1,526 3,441 7,597.70 
Exports 18,107 20,047 21,697 20,596 13,721 16,367 
Percentage Public 
debt to Exports 6.89% 6.79% 6.85% 7.41% 25.08% 46.42% 
Source: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of Finance 
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 Graph 3 
 
Source: Self calculation 
Similaly, the ratio of public debt over governmnet revenue has sprout up from a single digit i.e almost 9% 
to 102% which is not usual and is indicates the inorganic growth that the public debt has achieved over the 
governmnet revenue which is not sustainable and can be observed in table 4 and grpah 4. The government 
of the Sultanat has to think of ways and means to increase the government revenue to bring down its debt 
to revenue ratio. 
Table 4: Ratio of Public debt over Revenue 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Public Debt 1,247 1,361 1,486 1,526 3,441 7,597.70 
Revenue  12,720.2 14,345.8 14,998.8 14,419.6 9,015.9 7,448.5 
Percentage Public 
debt to Revenue 9.80% 9.49% 9.91% 10.58% 38.17% 102.00% 
Sources: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of Finance 
Graph 4 
 
Source: Self calculation 
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Furthermore, the primary sources of domestic government debt are GBDs, Treasury Bills and Sukuk. All 
these instruments are issued in Omani Rial.In 2015, the Government issued a Sukuk of OMR 250 million 
at a rate of 3.5 per cent. profit rate per annum and in July 2016, the Government issued a Sukuk of OMR 
192 million at a rate of 3.5 percent profit rate per annum.The amount of treasury bills outstanding was OMR 
306 million as at 31 December 2016 as compared with 465 million as at 31 December 2015.The following 
table5 sets forth the Government of Oman's domestic debt profile as at 31 December for each of the seven 
years ending 31 December 2016. According to Ostry, Ghosh, & Espinoza, (2015) where countries hold 
plenty fiscal space, administrations should not follow strategies that are meant at paying down the debt, as 
an alternative the government should allow the debt ratio to decline through growth and resourceful 
revenues, breathing with the debt otherwise. 
Table 5: Oman Government Domestic Debt 
As on 31 December(OMR millions) 
End of Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
Total government domestic debt 330 480 630 830 930 2,540.10 2,436.00 
GDBs(1) 330 480 630 830 930 1,325.10 1,630 
Sukuk(1) — — — — — 250 250 
Loans  from  local  banks(2) — — — — — 500 250 
Treasury  Bills(3) — — — — — 465 306 
*Preliminary Source: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of Finance 
Note: all instruments issued in local currency 
(1)    GDBs and Sukuk may be held by non-residents. Full amount of GDB issued is included here. 
(2)    Corresponds to a loan from Bank Muscat contracted in 2015 and due in 2017 
(3)    Treasury bills are held only by commercial banks Sources: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of 
Finance 
Oman's total external debt as at 31 December 2016 was approximately OMR 5.16 billion as compared to 
OMR 901.3 million as at 31 December 2015, mostly denominated in U.S. Dollars. The increase from 2015 
is primarily the result of an increase in commercial loans and bonds of OMR 4.16 billion, including the 
U.S.$4 billion issuance of the 3.625 per cent. notes due 2021 and 4.750 per cent. notes due 2026 and the 
U.S.$4 billion pre-export financing secured by PDO. Most of Oman's external debt is medium-term debt 
(more than one year to maturity and less than seven years to maturity). Oman's external debt is composed 
of commercial loans, export credits, loans from development institutions, Sukuk and short term loans.The 
following table6 sets forth Oman's external debt as at 31 December for each of the six years ended 31 
December 2015 and as at 31 December 2016. 
Table 6: Oman Government External Debt 
As on 31 December(OMR millions) 
End of Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total external debt 806.2 767.3 730.5 656.1 595.7 901.3 5,161.7 
Export credits 241.5 234.1 222.8 185.1 148.9 102.9 675.1 
Loans from development 
Institutions 439.1 407.6 382.1 345.4 321.2 289.1 325.6 
Commercial loans and bonds 125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6 509.3 3,584.6 
Sukuk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 192.1 
Short term loans 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 384.3 
Sources: Central Bank of Oman and Ministry of Finance 
 In addition, in the second quarter of 2016 the Government of Oman represented by the Ministry of Finance 
entered into a bilateral short-term loan in the amount of U.S. $1 billion with Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China Ltd to be repaid in May 2017. Also, as observed by Schclarek (2004), 59 emerging nations 
from 1970 to 2002 were studied and found that a significant inverse correlation existed between external 
debt and economic growth. 
 
Regression analysis  
The regression analysis of the above mentioned data of annual GDP and total government debt of Sultanate 
of Oman has shown below mentioned results. 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Public Debt 2776.45 2500.368088 
GDP 27883.73333 2982.626051 
Exports 18422.5 2983.761904 
Revenue 12158.13333 3173.001716 
Source: Self calculation 
The value of R as can be seen in the table 8 to the tune of 0.99 at 1% significance level shows the strong 
linear relationship between revenue, GDP, exports and public debt. Also, it shows the relevance of the 
model of taking annual government revenue, exports and GDP as a causal variable that has an impact on 
the outcome variable which in this case is total government debt of Oman. 
Table 8: Regression analysis 
Model 1 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Durbin-
Watson 
   Sig. F Change 
0.997424 0.994854 0.987135 2.631165 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Revenue, GDP, Exports 
b. Dependent Variable: Public Debt 
Source: Self calculation 
An analysis of the correlation between three variables have shown that the there is an inverse relationship 
between the public debt and GDP, exports and government revenue which also signifies the above made 
analysis. 
Table 9: Table Correlation  
  Public Debt GDP Exports Revenue  
Public Debt 1    
GDP -0.7865 1   
Exports -0.58438 0.704286 1  
Revenue  -0.88854 0.862051 0.888268 1 
Source: Self calculation 
 Graph 6 
 
Source: Self calculation 
The graph 6 shows how in tandem the annual GDP moves with the total government debt. The annual GDP 
is drawn against the predicted annual GDP. 
Besides, there are empirical studies conducted that have shown evidence of the different debt-growth 
connection under the different degrees of nation risk. Under a high-risk environment, a nation's economic 
growth is damaged by hovering its public debt. The negative effects public debt has on economic growth 
develops feeble under low political and financial-risk settings, while an upsurge in public debt could help 
to encourage economic growth under low compound and economic risk settings. Also, the variances of 
nations' income and debt intensities also lead nation risks to have dissimilar effects on the debt-growth 
connection, proposing that a nation should borrow suitably based on its existing risk settings while 
enlightening economic enactment (Chiu, et.al., 2017). 
Exploring new models 
Globally there are plenty of tools available for the debt management and financial analysis provided by 
many international renowed players in the field. One of the tools that Oman could possibly explore is 
Commonwealth Secretariat Public Debt Analytical Tool (CS-PDAT) which is specialized middle office/ 
front office decision support system and is designed to allow policy makers to manage public debt by having 
a focus on price and risk. The tool is built on an integrated structure for the growth and application of a debt 
management policy and enables debt administrators to progress and measure the costs and risks of substitute 
borrowing approaches (see Figure-2). 
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Source: Commonwealth Secretariat OECD 
The tool also permits policy makers to implement and observer their desired policy through the integration 
of debt management, improvement of an annual borrowing plan including an issuance calendar and liability 
management processes (for example, buybacks, exchanges, embedded options, restructuring, and swaps).  
The tool gives policy makers the ability to carry out a range of explorations, from basic to advanced, on the 
entire public debt collection. It focuses on the costs and risks associated with different borrowing strategies 
under different scenarios for analyzing substitute policies. Various market risks and refinancing risks are 
comprehensively analyzed through the application of the CS-PDAT system. 
Once the desired strategy is selected, CS-PDAT allows the debt manager to implement the strategy through 
the development of an annual borrowing plan, including the simulation of an issuance calendar for 
government securities. For the development of the domestic debt market, the system specifically supports 
the building up of benchmark bonds through re-openings of existing securities. 
For implementing a specific strategy within CS-PDAT, various debt management operations, such as buy-
backs, exchanges, prepayment, pre-financing, swaps, and the application of implanted choices, can be 
analyzed through its impact on the portfolio. Such liability management operations can also be included as 
part of the annual borrowing plan for comprehensive debt management planning. The system will also 
trigger the need for certain liability management operations based on any limits on refinancing risk 
stipulated by the debt manager. Finally, the system incorporates lending strategies and operations to allow 
a holistic analysis of any debt management strategy within an asset-liability risk management framework. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The Public Debt Management in Oman should encompass the main financial obligations over which the 
government exercises control. At the same time, debt managers, fiscal policy advisors, and central bank of 
Oman should share an understanding of the objectives of debt management, fiscal, and monetary policies 
given the interdependencies between their different policy instruments. Debt managers should convey to 
fiscal authorities their views on the costs and risks associated with government financing requirements and 
debt levels. 
Also, there should be a separation of debt management and monetary policy objectives and accountabilities. 
The debt management, fiscal, and monetary authorities should share information on the government’s 
current and future liquidity needs. The allocation of responsibilities among the ministry of finance, the 
central bank of Oman, or a separate debt management agency, for debt management policy advice, and for 
undertaking primary debt issues, secondary market arrangements, depository facilities, and clearing and 
settlement arrangements for trade in government securities, should be publicly disclosed. 
Besides, the significant aspects of debt management operations should be publicly disclosed. The public 
should be provided with information on the past, current, and projected budgetary activity, including its 
financing, and the consolidated financial position of the government. The legal framework should clarify 
the authority to borrow and to issue new debt, invest, and undertake transactions on the behalf of 
government of Saltant of Oman. The organizational framework for debt management should be well 
specified, and ensures that mandates and roles are well articulated. 
In addition, risks of government losses from inadequate operational controls should be managed according 
to sound business practices, including well-articulated responsibilities for staff, and clear monitoring and 
control policies and reporting arrangements. Sound business recovery procedures should be in place to 
mitigate the risk that debt management activities might be severely disrupted by natural disasters, social 
unrest. 
A framework should be developed to enable debt managers to identify and manage the trade- offs between 
expected cost and risk in the government debt portfolio. To assess risk, debt managers should regularly 
conduct stress tests of the debt portfolio on the basis of the economic and financial shocks to which the 
government and the country more generally are potentially exposed. The government of Oman should strive 
to achieve a broad investor base for its domestic and foreign obligations, with due regard to cost and risk, 
and should treat investors equitably. 
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